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The Campaign Against Double Taxation *
By Ralph Coughenour Jones
The serious discussion of double taxation, according to Pro­
fessor Seligman, began early in the thirteenth century. In recent 
years, however, interest in the subject has become intensified, not 
because modem tax laws are more unjust and conflicting than 
the laws of earlier times, but because the rapid extension of busi­
ness enterprises across the boundaries of states has created new 
opportunities for double taxation and made the burden more 
onerous. Double taxation will probably persist to a greater or 
less extent so long as we have economic interdependence on the 
one hand and a multiplicity of governmental units with their 
large spending programs on the other. So complicated are the 
problems to be solved that seven centuries more in the campaign 
against double taxation may still fail to bring complete success.
If the prospects of eliminating double taxation are so remote, 
one may well ask whether the attempt is worth while. It is clear, 
however, that the campaign must continue unabated if the 
burden is to be reduced or even prevented from increasing. The 
situation reminds one of the scene in Alice in Wonderland, where 
Alice, panting a little, says to the Red Queen: “Well, in our coun­
try, you’d generally get to somewhere else—if you ran very fast 
for a long time as we have been doing.” And the Red Queen 
replies: “A slow sort of country! Now, here, you see, it takes all 
the running you can do to keep in the same place.” In the face 
of a rising tide of taxation it will be no mean achievement merely 
to prevent an increase in double taxation. It is not a “slow sort 
of country” in which we live. All governmental units, large and 
small, are searching for new sources of revenue to help balance 
tottering budgets, and a rabid nationalism is rampant throughout 
the world. Only the utmost vigilance can prevent the appear­
ance of new instances of double or multiple taxation.
Before proceeding further it may be well to pause for a moment 
to consider the meaning of the term ‘‘ double taxation. ’’ ‘‘ Double 
taxation in the simplest sense,” according to Professor Seligman, 
“denotes the taxation of the same person or the same thing twice 
over.” (Essays in Taxation, 10th edition, New York, 1928, p.
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the Rhode Island Society of Certified Public 
Accountants, Providence, R. I., April 17, 1934.
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98.) This definition admittedly is too broad. Professor Fred R. 
Fairchild of Yale University has formulated a definition which 
corresponds more closely to accepted usage. “Double taxation,” 
he says, “is the imposition of the same tax upon the same object 
twice during the same fiscal period by the same jurisdiction or by 
coordinate jurisdictions.” There can be no doubt that anything 
which comes within the limits of this definition is double taxation, 
and there can be little doubt that it is unjust and discriminatory. 
Note that according to this definition double taxation does not 
occur when both a state and the federal government levy a tax 
upon the same income. Here the jurisdictions are not coordinate. 
The search for an exact definition, however, is difficult and per­
haps unnecessary. Double taxation in this paper will be used in 
the sense of Professor Fairchild’s definition. It is this type of 
double taxation which we are seeking to eliminate. Though double 
taxation occurs in many forms, I shall devote attention chiefly 
to the problem as it arises in the taxation of business income.
The need for constant vigilance to prevent the increase of 
double taxation was well illustrated during the consideration of the 
revenue bill of 1934. In at least three sections, the bill as adopted 
by the house of representatives provided new forms of double 
taxation. Section 131 arbitrarily reduced by one half the credit 
for taxes paid abroad; section 403 imposed upon American citizens 
resident abroad the full federal estate tax on all property, real as 
well as personal, wherever situated; and section 104 authorized 
the president, in certain circumstances, to double the taxes of each 
citizen and corporation of a foreign country. Strong protests by 
the committee on double taxation of the American section of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the treasury department 
and others led to the adoption of amendments correcting the 
worst features of sections 131 and 403 of the house bill, but section 
104 remained essentially unchanged.
The credit for foreign taxes is necessary in the United States as 
a measure of partial relief from the double taxation which would 
otherwise result from the inconsistency of taxing at the same time 
all income having its origin in the United States and all the income 
of American citizens, residents and corporations, regardless of 
origin. It would be better in many ways to avoid double taxa­
tion by exempting all income, or at least all business income, 
having its origin in another country, but such a move might not 
be feasible politically. The present provision, however, is wrong 
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psychologically in that it creates the impression that the govern­
ment is granting a special favor to certain taxpayers who are 
generally assumed to be large corporations. The opposite, of 
course, is true. It is no special favor to receive a credit against a 
tax which should never have been levied, particularly when the 
credit under certain conditions is less than the tax on the income 
earned abroad. The assumption that the credit is primarily 
beneficial to large corporations is also of doubtful validity. Such 
corporations usually derive a relatively small proportion of their 
total income from foreign sources and they are, as a rule, in the 
best position to avoid a double tax by means of subsidiary com­
panies or other devices. Companies of moderate size engaged 
principally in international trade would be more apt to suffer 
heavily from the elimination of the credit.
In any event, the elimination of the credit would simply add 
another impediment to the revival of foreign trade, with little, if 
any, increase in revenue. The action of the house in seeking to 
reduce the credit by one half was obviously an illogical com­
promise. It recognized the principle and at the same time 
denied its application. The full credit was continued in the 
revenue act of 1934, but the struggle to prevent its emasculation 
will undoubtedly have to be resumed when future revenue bills are 
under consideration.
The amendments to the estate tax, section 403 of the house bill, 
constituted deliberate double and probably confiscatory taxation 
of the estates of decedent citizens resident abroad, possibly with 
the intention of punishing expatriates. These amendments vio­
lated the generally accepted rule that the country in which a 
person has his residence is entitled to tax the entire estate, except 
real property situated elsewhere. They violated also the almost 
universal rule that real estate is taxable only in the country in 
which it is situated. Section 404 of the act as finally adopted, 
however, does exclude real estate situated abroad from the gross 
estate of decedents, but apparently in the case of non-resident 
citizens the full estate tax must be paid on other property situated 
abroad.
With respect to section 104 of the bill, the following recom­
mendation was made:
“The committee on double taxation of the American section of 
the International Chamber of Commerce recommends that if 
section 104 of the bill is to be adopted, it should be amended so as
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to cover the matter of allocation of income and also to permit the 
executive branch of the government to enter into agreements with 
foreign countries looking toward the elimination of discriminatory 
taxes and providing for equitable methods of allocating income 
for the purpose of taxation among the several countries in which 
the activities occur.”
Section 104 of the bill became section 103 of the act, but the 
spirit remained the same. Section 103 provides, in part, that 
“whenever the president finds that, under the laws of any foreign 
country, citizens or corporations of the United States are being 
subjected to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes, the president 
shall so proclaim and the rates of tax imposed . . . shall, for the 
taxable year during which such proclamation is made and for 
each taxable year thereafter, be doubled in the case of each citizen 
and corporation of such foreign country. ...” This section is, 
of course, designed to protect American interests, but even the 
most elementary knowledge of human nature suggests that it is 
much more apt to evoke retaliation than cooperation. A real 
advance in reducing double taxation could have been made, 
however, if the president had been given the power to make 
reciprocal agreements with other nations as well as to threaten 
them. If the president is to have the power to punish discrimi­
nation by other countries, he should, it would seem, be given the 
power to remove any discrimination against their nationals which 
may appear in our own law. He is now in the anomalous position 
of being able to punish others for abuses which he is unable to 
remove from the laws of his own country.
The reference to agreements with foreign countries arises no 
doubt from the interest of the International Chamber of Com­
merce in the efforts of the League of Nations to reduce or elimi­
nate double taxation. It was the international chamber, as a 
matter of fact, which started in 1919 a sustained movement to 
reduce international double taxation. The active direction of 
this work was later assumed by the League of Nations.
The first step in the league’s campaign was a careful analysis of 
the economic fundamentals of the problem prepared by Professor 
Bruins of Holland, Senator Einaudi of Italy, Sir Josiah Stamp of 
England and Professor Seligman of Columbia University. Their 
report was published under the date of April 5, 1923. Subse­
quently, the whole problem was studied at a general meeting of 
government experts on double taxation and tax evasion, and
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their report was published in October, 1928. It contained, 
among other things, three model bilateral conventions, Ia, Ib, and 
Ic, for the use of states wishing to reduce double taxation by 
treaty. Three drafts were thought to be necessary because of the 
different types of fiscal systems existing in various countries. 
Several treaties have since been drawn along the lines of these 
model conventions.
It was apparent, however, that a more complete study of the 
problem was needed and, largely through the efforts of the late 
Dr. T. S. Adams of Yale, a grant of $90,000 was obtained from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to finance a thorough investigation. 
Mitchell B. Carroll, former special attorney in the United States 
treasury department, was appointed to direct the inquiry. The 
results of this study have since been published in five volumes. 
The first three volumes contain descriptions of the tax systems of 
23 countries and three American states, written by the tax ad­
ministrators or experts in each country or state. These descrip­
tions, naturally, will soon be out of date as to details, but they 
give a good picture of general fiscal policies which will probably 
be fairly permanent. Volume IV contains Mr. Carroll’s sum­
mary of the whole survey, and volume V contains my own study 
of some of the accounting aspects of allocation.
The survey made by the League of Nations reveals a substan­
tial agreement among the authorities of the several nations on a 
number of important points. It is generally agreed, for instance, 
that business income should be taxed only in those countries in 
which permanent establishments of an enterprise are located, and 
the term “permanent establishment” has been defined with 
considerable care. It is generally agreed, moreover, that the 
rental of land, royalty on mines and other income definitely re­
lating to land should be taxed in the country in which the land is 
situated. Serious difficulties still exist, however, between debtor 
and creditor countries with respect to the taxation of interest, 
dividends and the like.
After the conclusion of the survey by the League of Nations, the 
fiscal committee adopted a draft convention for the allocation of 
business income between states for the purposes of taxation. 
This convention and the three model bilateral conventions previ­
ously mentioned provide the machinery for making allocations of 
practically all types of taxable income between countries which are 
disposed to eliminate double taxation by agreement. Several 
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bilateral treaties have already been made, and it is to be hoped 
that the latest draft convention on the allocation of income will 
likewise be favorably received. If the countries of the world suc­
ceed in reaching some workable solution to the more pressing 
problems of currency stabilization and tariffs, it is not improbable 
that they will turn their attention again to the problems of double 
taxation.
Even though the proposed draft convention were generally 
adopted, some difficult problems of allocation would still remain. 
The convention states the principle which is to govern allocations 
of business income, but does not prescribe methods in detail. 
The draft convention definitely adopts the principle of separate 
accounting as standard and provides optional methods to be used 
only when the separate accounts of the permanent establishments 
of an enterprise in one of the contracting states do not fairly 
reflect the income allocable thereto.
Article 3 (draft convention adopted for the allocation of busi­
ness income between states for purposes of taxation):
“If an enterprise with its fiscal domicile in one contracting 
state has permanent establishments in other contracting states, 
there shall be attributed to each permanent establishment the net 
business income which it might be expected to derive if it were 
an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar ac­
tivities under the same or similar conditions. Such net income 
will, in principle, be determined on the basis of the separate ac­
counts pertaining to such establishment. Subject to the pro­
visions of this convention, such income shall be taxed in accord­
ance with the legislation and international agreements of the 
state in which such establishment is situated.
“The fiscal authorities of the contracting states shall, when 
necessary, in execution of the preceding paragraph, rectify the 
accounts produced, notably to correct errors or omissions, or 
to re-establish the prices or remunerations entered in the books 
at the value which would prevail between independent persons 
dealing at arm’s length.
“If an establishment does not produce an accounting showing 
its own operations, or if the accounting produced does not cor­
respond to the normal usages of the trade in the country where 
the establishment is situated, or if the rectifications provided for 
in the preceding paragraph can not be effected, or if the taxpayer 
agrees, the fiscal authorities may determine empirically the busi­
ness income by applying a percentage to the turnover of that 
establishment. This percentage is fixed in accordance with the 
nature of the transactions in which the establishment is engaged 
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and by comparison with the results obtained by similar enter­
prises operating in the country.
“If the methods of determination described in the preceding 
paragraphs are found to be inapplicable, the net business income 
of the permanent establishment may be determined by a com­
putation based on the total income derived by the enterprise from 
the activities in which such establishment has participated. 
This determination is made by applying to the total income 
coefficients based on a comparison of gross receipts, assets, number 
of hours worked or other appropriate factors, provided such 
factors be so selected as to ensure results approaching as closely as 
possible to those which would be reflected by a separate account­
ing.” (League Document C.399.M.204. 1933, II, A(F/Fiscal 
76).)
If the separate accounts are unsatisfactory, the tax authorities 
are expected to try, first, to rectify or to adjust the accounts and, 
failing this, to determine the income empirically by the percentage 
of turnover or gross profits method. Only as a last resort are 
they to make a fractional apportionment of the entire net income 
of the enterprise.
The soundness of the procedure here outlined is generally recog­
nized throughout the world, not only by accountants but also by 
business men, lawyers and tax officers. The method of separate 
accounting effectually eliminates the reporting of a single item of 
income in more than one jurisdiction; it simplifies the preparation 
and the verification of tax returns, since only the figures of a 
single establishment need be considered; and, if honestly used, it 
produces more accurate results by reducing the zone of uncertainty 
which is inevitably present in all apportionments. General ap­
portionment, on the other hand, places upon international enter­
prises the burden of reporting on their world-wide business to 
many countries with different currencies and laws. The results, 
moreover, can not be accurate. All apportionment fractions 
allocate profits in a uniform ratio to all establishments of an 
enterprise, and yet if there is one certainty it is that the profits of 
different establishments do vary—in rate as well as in amount. 
Certain establishments may earn profits while others suffer losses, 
but an apportionment fraction always assigns profits to all alike.
During the league’s investigation of allocation methods, services 
of great value were rendered by a special committee on inter­
national double taxation of the American Institute of Account­
ants, with which it was my pleasure to be unofficially associated. 
It was the primary concern of this committee to prevent the 
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adoption of unsound principles of allocation. It was not particu­
larly concerned with detailed methods. The principle which the 
committee recommended in its statement of April 25, 1931, how­
ever, has now been adopted and the time for the development and 
refinement of methods is at hand. Research on the theoretical 
aspects of the problem is needed, but even more important is the 
practical application of methods already known. In the final 
analysis, each enterprise must be treated as an individual problem.
The concept of taxing each separate establishment as if it were 
an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities 
is simple enough, but the application of the principle raises a host 
of difficulties. It will not be easy to install systems of accounting 
adequate to convince doubting tax officers that intra-company 
transactions are priced as if they were made “at arm’s length.” 
The evidence, nevertheless, indicates that even now, without the 
benefit of the draft convention, separate accounts which are 
honestly and fairly set up are rather generally acceptable to tax 
authorities.
The Allocation Problem Within the United States
The problems of double taxation and allocation, however, are 
not restricted to the international field. They arise in the great­
est profusion within the United States. To most taxpayers and 
accountants, indeed, the domestic problems are apt to over­
shadow the international ones, especially since foreign trade has 
dwindled to a mere trickle. Some twenty-six states now have 
income-tax laws, and, of these, twenty-four tax corporate net in­
comes. Because additional states are adopting the income tax 
almost every year, the magnitude of the problems to be faced 
should be evident.
The internal situation is affected by two important factors not 
present in the international sphere: namely, the practice of doing 
business with little regard for state lines, and the federal form of 
government under which presumably sovereign states are bound 
by a constitution as interpreted by the supreme court. The first 
factor makes allocation difficult because the economic relation­
ships between states have become both numerous and intricate; 
the second impedes the process of adjustment which would cer­
tainly occur if the power of taxation were centralized in the na­
tional government and might occur if the states had treaty-mak­
ing powers.
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The personal income-tax statutes, with only one or two excep­
tions, follow the federal law and levy a tax on all income originat­
ing within the state and on the entire income of residents, regard­
less of origin. If this practice continues as additional states adopt 
the income tax, the burden of double taxation will materially in­
crease. The corporate income tax, however, applies as a rule only 
to income having its origin within the state. Only three or four 
states, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, and possibly 
Mississippi, have provisions under which domestic corporations 
may be taxed on their entire net incomes from sources both within 
and without the state. Every state law levying a tax on corpo­
rate net incomes, however, must provide some means for making 
allocations, and it is this problem which will now be considered.
In the United States general apportionment has been by far the 
most popular method of allocation. Most of the states, however, 
are willing to accept returns based on a separate accounting if the 
taxpayer can show that his accounts do reasonably reflect the 
income having its origin within the state. The prevalent use of 
apportionment fractions is due not so much to a general preference 
for this method as it is to the lack of any other that can be gener­
ally applied. A number of tax administrators prefer the method 
of separate accounting in theory, but the flow of business across 
state lines makes its use difficult and in some cases impossible. 
Apportionment fractions have been introduced, therefore, as a 
matter of administrative necessity. While these fractions will 
not, except by coincidence, allocate the income of any given corpo­
ration accurately to the various states in which it is earned, they 
will, if uniform, effect a reasonable apportionment on the average. 
Let me emphasize the point—they can be made to operate reason­
ably on the average, but they can not be made to produce accurate 
allocations of the incomes of individual enterprises. This fact, 
in the light of recent supreme court decisions, is of considerable 
importance.
Various committees of the National Tax Association have de­
voted much time to the search for an ideal apportionment frac­
tion. All apportionment fractions, however, merely serve to cut 
the Gordian knot of complex economic relationships; therefore, in 
the theoretical sense there can be no such thing as an ideal frac­
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2. Reasonableness.
3. Simplicity and ease of administration.
4. Constitutionality.
As a means of eliminating double taxation, uniformity is by far 
the most important. Though the importance of uniformity has 
long been recognized, until recently little progress had been made 
toward securing it. There is, however, one formula which stands 
a fair chance of general adoption, namely, the Massachusetts 
formula. It has been used with general satisfaction to both tax­
payers and the state for over ten years. Five states have already 
adopted it, and six others are using fractions which do not differ 
greatly in result. The formula may be stated thus:
Mass. tangibles Mass. payrolls Mass. sales -------------- -  +------------------ ------------— 





In arriving at the amount of allocable net income, the income re­
ported on the federal tax return is adjusted for differences between 
federal and state definitions of taxable income and for such items 
as interest, dividends and capital gains which are allocated di­
rectly to sources within and without the state.
This formula takes a middle ground between the extreme frac­
tions which would apportion the total income on the basis of 
tangible property alone, as in Connecticut, or on the basis of sales 
alone, as in Tennessee. It is simple, easy to administer and rea­
sonable on its face. Tangible property and payrolls within and 
without the state can be easily determined. The sales factor 
may offer some difficulty in this respect, but apparently it must be 
included for political reasons. The general adoption of the 
Massachusetts formula would unquestionably constitute an im­
portant advance in the campaign to eliminate double taxation.
Were it not for the constitution and the United States supreme 
court, it might be feasible to concentrate all effort into the attempt 
to secure uniform methods of apportionment among the states. 
The apportionment of the net income reported to the federal 
government is so much simpler than separate accounting that it 
might well be preferred by taxpayers, as well as tax officers, if 
uniform methods were once introduced. The Supreme Court, 
however, in Hans Rees Sons Co. v. North Carolina, 51 S. Ch. 385, 
has ruled that no apportionment, no matter how fair the fraction 
may be in its general application, will stand in any individual 
case in which the taxpayer can prove that the income actually 
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originating within a state is less than that apportioned thereto by 
the fraction. This rule is perfectly sound, but nevertheless it 
places the states in a difficult position. They can not depend en­
tirely on apportionment fractions because of the rule. They can 
not compel all returns to be made on the basis of separate ac­
counts because such accounts simply are non-existent in most 
cases. And if they accept returns based on either a general ap­
portionment or a separate accounting, the taxpayers will naturally 
take the more favorable option and an unascertainable amount of 
corporate net income will avoid state income taxes altogether.
The position of the accountant, however, is reasonably clear. 
If the statutory method of apportionment in any state allocates 
to that state substantially more than the net income actually 
earned therein, he should prepare the tax return on the basis of a 
separate accounting for the establishment operating within the 
state. In so doing, the accountant will not only be serving the 
interests of his client but he will also be contributing something 
toward a final solution of the problems of allocation. The pro­
fession should not, and we believe does not, condone the use of 
biased accounts or other devices to evade the payment of a rea­
sonable tax, but certainly it could not be a violation of even the 
strictest code of ethics to insist on reporting the taxable income 
actually derived from operations within a given state.
The term “separate accounting” is somewhat vague and does 
not refer to any particular method. It carries the implication 
that the different branches or divisions of an enterprise are to be 
treated as nearly as possible like independent business units. To 
the author, however, separate accounting is simply a method for 
determining the income attributable to particular establishments 
with a maximum of direct allocation and a minimum of apportion­
ment. In other words, it is place accounting based on direct 
charges and credits for goods and services given and received. 
This requires the use of quoted market prices and other independ­
ent criteria wherever possible as means of reducing or eliminating 
the amount of income or expense which would otherwise have to 
be divided by apportionment.
Items which can be specifically assigned to one particular state 
are rentals, royalties, interest and dividends received, capital 
gains on property which has a fixed situs, etc. There is another 
class of income which can be specifically assigned: namely, income 
from ventures not directly connected with the principal business 
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being carried on in two or more states. It has been held, for in­
stance, that where one company owns and operates two distinct 
lines of railroad, one within and the other without the state, the 
state can not apply its allocation formula to the entire net income 
of the company, but must tax only the income of the line within 
the state. (Piedmont & N. R. Co. v. Query, 56 F. (2d) 172.) 
Likewise, in the case of Palmolive Company v. Conway, 43 F. (2d) 
226, it was held that Wisconsin could tax a fair share of the profits 
from the manufacture and sale of soap, partly within and partly 
without the state, but could tax no part of the profits of an ad­
vertising agency which the company maintained entirely without 
the state.
After all possible items have been directly allocated in any given 
case, the remaining net income will be only that amount which in 
the language of the courts is ascribable to a unitary business. 
Such income is a true joint product of operations in two or more 
states. Even this income can, however, be directly allocated by 
separate accounting where quoted market prices are available for 
the product in the different stages of production and distribution. 
This contention is supported by at least three decided cases: 
Standard Oil Co. v. Thorensen, 29 F. (2d) 708, North Dakota; 
Standard Oil Co. v. Wis. Tax Comm., 197 Wis. 630; 223 N. W. 85; 
Buick Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d) 385, Wisconsin.
The evidence in the two oil company cases showed that the 
profits earned on sales in each of the states could be determined 
accurately by charging current market prices for oil to the dis­
tributing branches. The courts held that the states could there­
fore tax no part of the profits due to the functions of producing or 
refining. They could not, in other words, apply an allocation 
fraction to total company income. The results in the Buick case 
were similar though the details were different. The manufactur­
ing company in Michigan had organized a wholly owned sales 
company which had agreed to handle the distribution of Buick 
automobiles throughout the world for a fixed annual profit which 
was merely nominal in amount. Since Wisconsin’s apportioned 
share of this profit was clearly unreasonable as the taxable profit 
on the sale of several million dollars’ worth of automobiles, the 
tax commission audited the accounts of the distributing agency 
within the state and found that the amount of profit from Wis­
consin operations could be determined by charging cars to the 
agency at regular dealer prices. The commission found, more­
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over, that the company actually made the charges on this basis in 
its own accounting and arbitrarily reduced the profit to the agreed 
amount by adjustments at the end of each year. Needless to say, 
the court upheld the tax commission in its determination. These 
cases make it clear that the courts will compel, or at least have 
compelled, tax commissions to recognize separate determinations 
of profit when apportionment is manifestly unjust to the tax­
payer. They will also uphold an assessment based on an exami­
nation of the separate accounts of a branch where it is clear that 
only thus can a proper allocation of income be made.
The question still remains, however, whether allocations can be 
made by separate accounting if there are no quoted market prices 
or recognized dealer prices. In my opinion, allocations by ac­
counting methods can still be made in many instances. To illus­
trate, let us suppose that a Rhode Island manufacturing company 
effects sales through branches in Massachusetts. If it bills its 
product to these branches at manufacturing cost, including normal 
factory overhead, it is obvious that the profit allocable to Massa­
chusetts can not exceed the gross profit on Massachusetts sales 
less the operating expenses of the branches in Massachusetts. If 
nothing remains, no profit can properly be assigned to Massa­
chusetts even though the enterprise as a whole is profitable and 
would, under the apportionment method, have to pay a sub­
stantial tax in Massachusetts. The state tax commission would, 
no doubt, recognize this fact. If a profit remains, however, after 
deducting the Massachusetts expenses, only part of it should be 
taxed there. The other portion represents the so-called manu­
facturing profit attributable to operations in Rhode Island.
This problem of making a separate determination of manufac­
turing profit and selling profit is a fascinating one. Unfortunately 
it can never be completely solved, for profit, after all, is the result 
of the manufacture and the sale of goods, not the result of either 
function alone. Profit of this kind must be apportioned unless an 
intermediate price is fixed on the open market or by the customary 
margins allowed to independent dealers. In making this ap­
portionment, however, it is not necessary to apportion the entire 
net income of the business. A much more accurate apportion­
ment can be made on the basis of the component elements enter­
ing into the ultimate selling price of the goods. Let us suppose 
that the Rhode Island Manufacturing Company sold $1,000,000 
worth of goods through its branches in Massachusetts, and an-
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other $1,000,000 worth through its branches in Wisconsin. A 
careful analysis of these sales, we may assume, reveals the follow­
ing facts:
Sales....................................................














Total operating costs....................... ........ $ 600,000 $ 800,000
Net profit (loss)................................ ........ $ 100,000 ($ 100,000)
Since two-thirds of the operating costs assignable to the goods 
sold through Massachusetts branches were attributable to the 
manufacturing function and one-third to the selling function, it 
seems entirely fair to allocate two-thirds of the profit, or $66,667, 
to Rhode Island and one-third, or $33,333, to Massachusetts, as­
suming that all distribution costs were incurred in Massachusetts. 
Whether the loss on Wisconsin sales should be divided equally 
between the factory and the sales branches or assigned entirely to 
the state of sale is a moot question. It is clear, however, that no 
profit whatever should be allocated to Wisconsin. Paradoxically 
enough, the Massachusetts formula, and other general apportion­
ment fractions as well, would ordinarily assign more profit to 
Wisconsin than to Massachusetts. The sales were identical, 
tangible property may well have been the same, and salaries 
and wages in Wisconsin almost certainly exceeded those in 
Massachusetts since the cost of distribution in Wisconsin was 
twice as high.
The suggested method for apportioning the joint profit of two 
or more establishments on the basis of operating costs applicable 
to the goods jointly handled, thus has one important advantage 
over all general apportionment fractions. It can allocate profits 
to some branches and losses to others closely in accordance with 
actual results, while all general apportionment formulae neces­
sarily spread profits evenly over all territories. It does, however, 
require a first-class system of cost accounting, while the other 
formulae may be applied to the figures supplied by almost any 
general accounting system.
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In conclusion, the present situation with respect to allocation 
may be briefly summarized as follows: (a) The method of separate 
accounting has been definitely adopted by the League of Nations 
after a far-reaching study of conditions and methods throughout 
the world; (b) general apportionment on the basis of statutory 
formulae is still the prevailing method in use by American states 
having corporate income-tax laws; (c) but the supreme court of 
the United States has sustained the right of a taxpayer to make a 
return on the basis of a separate accounting whenever a statutory 
fraction results in the allocation of more income to the taxing state 
than was actually earned therein. The possibilities of separate 
accounting as a method of allocation thus merit further investi­
gation. If accountants succeed in developing and applying satis­
factory methods for the direct allocation of income, they will have 
contributed much toward the reduction of the present burden of 
double taxation.
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